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Abstract 
This paper investigates the allocation decision of an investor who owns two projects, a 
domestic and a foreign one. A manager governs the expected return from each project, and the 
investor has less information on the actions of the foreign manager.  The investor’s portfolio 
will be tilted relative to a situation with full information.  With asymmetric information, he 
generally achieves a better risk-return characteristic of his net terminal wealth with an 
allocation different from full diversification, because a “biased” allocation can be beneficial to 
the managers’ efforts and/or risk properties of the optimal contracts.  However, numerical 
simulations illustrate that, in general, the portfolio bias is small for plausible parameter 
values, and theoretically it may even be towards the foreign project.  This weakens the case 
for asymmetric information as a prime reason for the observed home-bias in portfolio 
allocation. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The bias towards domestic markets in international asset allocation, documented in 
e.g. French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis  (1994), and Tesar and Werner (1995), 
has been one of the most extensively researched areas in international finance during the last 
10-15 years. This behavior is labeled the “home-bias puzzle” since it is squarely at odds with 
the predictions of standard international portfolio selection models (e.g. Adler and Dumas, 
1983), and the estimated gains in terms of the risk-return trade-off from international 
diversification risk appear to be substantial (Grauer and Håkansson, 1987). 
A number of possible explanations of the home-bias puzzle have been discussed in the 
literature.1 Among these is the hypothesis that there is asymmetric information across 
countries.  Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997) explore the implications of investors, 
on average, being better informed about the risk-return characteristics of domestic stocks, and 
they show that this leads to home-bias in portfolio holdings.  Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) 
analyze a “lemons” problem where foreigners systematically overpay for domestic firms - 
from the point of view of the domestic investors – because they cannot observe firm-specific 
shocks.  Foreign investors may still gain from acquiring domestic firms since they face a 
lower cost of capital in this model, but capital mobility would be lower than with full 
information. 
 The present paper adds to this research by investigating a model where domestic 
investors have less information about the actions of managers in charge of their foreign 
projects, compared to the information available on domestic managers.  The investors may 
still want to invest in foreign projects, however, because the return on the projects is partly a 
function of project specific shocks, which are imperfectly correlated.  The extent to which 
they want to invest in foreign projects depends on the effort-level they can generate from 
foreign managers through optimal contracts. 
Our paper differs from those above in that moral hazard creates the information 
problem, and optimal contracts are at the center stage of the analysis.  We argue that hidden 
actions may be equally plausible as the information distortions analyzed in earlier research on 
the home-bias puzzle.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 416) emphasize the importance of moral 
                                                          
1 Besides asymmetric information, the most common explanations are the existence of non-traded income risk, 
non-traded consumption goods, and statistical measurement problems.  See Lewis (1999) for a recent survey. 
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hazard in explaining why friction-free models of international asset trade square so poorly 
with data, including portfolio allocation across countries. 
It could be argued that foreign investors might avoid possible information 
disadvantages by investing in a diversified portfolio of publicly traded domestic firms.  This 
would not eliminate the disadvantage, however, since only a subset of national firms list their 
shares on public exchanges and information available to domestic investors might possibly 
not be fully conveyed through market prices, due to noise in these prices.  Another argument 
against the relevance of asymmetric information across countries is that foreign investors can 
hire local experts. Since those experts would be better informed than the investor, a serious 
asymmetric information problem would materialize in this case as well.2  The model 
presented here is easiest interpreted as investments in individual firms rather than in 
diversified portfolios.  A large fraction of purchases of foreign assets takes the form of direct 
investment and thus, studying such investment decisions in the context of the home-bias 
puzzle also seems relevant. 
The model we develop draws on the dynamic principal-agent problems by Holmström 
and Milgrom (1987), Schättler and Sung (1993), Sung (1995), and Müller (1998).  That is, we 
study a continuous-time model where output follows a Brownian motion and both the 
principal (the investor) and the agents (the managers) have constant absolute risk aversion.  
This is a natural point of departure since, unlike the static principal-agent model, the 
continuous-time version admits a simple closed-form solution: the optimal compensation 
schemes are linear in output.  To this principal-agent problem, we add a portfolio problem on 
behalf of the principal who can invest his resources in a domestic and a foreign project.  The 
managers control the drift rates of the Brownian motions governing output.  It is easier for the 
investor to observe the actions of the domestic than those of the foreign manager.  
Specifically, domestic effort will be assumed to be perfectly observable while the effort put in 
by the foreign manager is unobservable. 
Compared to a situation with full and symmetric information, the investor’s allocation 
policy will be tilted.  The mechanisms behind this can be explained by observing that the 
argument in the investor’s (expected) utility function is X1 + X1* − (S + S*), where X1 [X1*] is 
output from his domestic [foreign] project and S [S*] is the salary paid to the domestic 
[foreign] manager.  Later we will refer to this expression as the investor’s net terminal wealth. 
                                                          
2 See the papers by Gehrig (1993), Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), and Brennan and Cao (1997) for further 
arguments in favor of the relevance of asymmetric information across countries.   
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In the first-best situation, the two managers will make the same effort for given 
invested resources in their respective projects.  In the model, this implies that expected value 
of W1 ≡ X1 + X1* is independent of the allocation of resources between the two projects.  
Moreover, both the expected value and standard deviation of total salary costs (S + S*) are 
independent of the allocation decision with full information.  This leaves only the variability 
of W1 as relevant for the allocation decision, and this is minimized by what we label ‘full 
diversification’.  
With asymmetric information, the domestic manager will make higher effort than the 
foreign manager for given invested resources.  Hence, the expected value of W1 can be 
increased by investing more resources at home than abroad.  This will unambiguously 
contribute to a home-bias.  However, with asymmetric information, the expected value and 
variability of salary costs (S + S*) are also affected by the allocation decision.  For instance, 
the size of the constant amounts or what fraction of output the managers are to keep according 
to the salary contracts is in part determined by how the investor allocates his resources.  The 
consequences for the allocation decision are ambiguous however.  That is, it may be that 
allocating more resources to the domestic project make the optimal contracts less attractive as 
seen from the investor.  If so, the effect on (S + S*) will counteract the home-bias induced by 
asymmetric information on the expected value of W1.  Indeed, it is theoretically possible that 
the optimal portfolio will be tilted towards the foreign project.  But the opposite may also be 
the case; the effect on (S + S*) can strengthen the home-bias in portfolio allocation.  
Numerical simulations illustrate that, for plausible parameter values, the portfolio bias is 
likely to be towards the domestic project, but seems to be small in magnitude. 
 Section 2 presents the model and the solution to the first-best problem.  The case of 
asymmetric information across countries is analyzed in section 3.  In section 4 we present 
some numerical illustrations, and then conclude and discuss some possible extensions in 
section 5. 
 
2.  The Model and the Full Information Case 
 
 We investigate the principal-agent relationship on the time interval [0,1].  At time 0, 
the principal (the investor) decides how to allocate his initial resources W0 to two projects, a 
domestic and a foreign project. The investment decisions are assumed to be irreversible; the 
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allocation is fixed until time 1.3  The output from the projects is publicly observable and 
governed by the processes  
 
0 0
* * * * *
0 0
,
,
t t t
t t t
dX u X dt X dz
dX u X dt X dz
= + σ
= + σ
 
for the domestic and foreign project, respectively.  In these equations, X0 [X0*] is the amount 
invested in the domestic [foreign] project, so that X0 + X0* = W0.  Furthermore, σ is the 
common diffusion parameter, while dz and dz∗ are standard wiener processes representing 
shocks, which are considered as project-specific.  The instantaneous correlation coefficient, ρ, 
of these shocks is obtained from dzdz∗ = ρdt, ρ∈[-1,1).  The drift variables ut and ut* are 
controlled by a domestic and foreign agent (manager) respectively, and may or may not be 
observed by the investor. On basis of these assumptions, the investor’s wealth accumulation 
equation can be written as 
 [ ]* * 0 0( ) 't t t t tdW u u u W dt W d= ω − + + Σw B , (1) 
where 
 
2
0
1
σ 
=  
σρ σ − ρ 
Σ , 
ω is the fraction of initial wealth invested in the domestic project, w´ = [ω (1−ω)], dB = [dz  
dh]´, and dh a standard wiener process independent of dz. 
At time 0, the investor and the mangers individually agree on sharing rules specifying 
payment from the investor to the managers at time 1.  The sharing rules specify salaries S and 
S* for the domestic and foreign manager, respectively, and are random via dependence on the 
outcome of the stochastic process for W.  The managers’ control variables, u ≥ 0 and u* ≥ 0, 
can be revised continuously during the time interval [0,1] and may depend on the history of W 
in [0,t], but not on the future (t,1].  The managers incur costs for putting effort into the 
projects. For simplicity, these costs are assumed to be given by ½kut2 and ½k(ut*)2, 
respectively, where k is a constant.  The important thing is that the effort costs are convex.  
Using the quadratic form makes the model easier to solve. 
                                                          
3 This assumption is imposed to obtain tractability, since allowing for continuous reallocation would introduce 
time-dependent drifts in the processes for X and X*.  Schättler and Sung (1997) show that introducing time-
dependent drifts of the Brownian motions would destroy the result that sharing rules are linear in output, and 
thus also the tractability of the model. 
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Finally, both the investor and the managers have exponential time separable utility.  
The investor’s constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion is R while the two managers are 
equally risk averse with a CARA-coefficient r. 
For the sake of later comparison, let us first characterize the optimal sharing rules, 
effort levels, and resource allocation in the first-best setting; that is, when the managers’ 
controls are observable and can be enforced at no cost.  At time 0, the investor’s first-best 
problem is 
 ( ){ }[ ]
* *
*
1
{ , }, , ,
max exp
u u S S
E R W S S
ω
− − − − , (2) 
subject to (1) and subject to the managers’ participation constraints: 
 ( ){ } { }1 212 00exp exptE r S k u dt rU − − − ≥ − − ∫ , (3) 
 ( ){ } { }1* * 212 00exp ( ) exptE r S k u dt rU − − − ≥ − − ∫ , (4) 
where U0 is the managers’ certainty equivalent at time 0, assumed to be identical for the 
domestic and the foreign manager.  The solution to this problem is summed up in the first 
result. 
 
Proposition 1: Under full information, the salaries of the domestic and the foreign manager 
are equal, linear in combined output and given by 
 * 12
RS S K W
r R
= = +
+
, (5) 
where 
11 21
20 0
( 2 ) ln( / )K r R r R RW rk u dt−  ≡ + λ − + ∫  is a constant.  Moreover, the effort 
levels are constant, equal across countries, and determined by the equality of marginal 
productivity of invested resources and marginal cost of effort 
 *0 0
(1 )W u u W
k k
ω − ω
= = = . (6) 
Finally, the investor allocates equal amounts to the domestic and the foreign project, 
 
*
2
0
( 2 ) 1 1
2 22 (1 )
r Ru u
rW R
+−
ω = + =
σ − ρ . (7) 
 
The proof is in the appendix.   
The optimal sharing rule given in (5) is very similar to the corresponding rule in the 
one-agent model of Müller (1998).  One difference is that the coefficient before W1 gives 
more weight to the principal’s risk aversion, since he now shares the final output with two 
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agents.  It also worth noting that the first-best sharing rules imply full risk sharing between the 
domestic and the foreign manager.  They receive a fixed share of total output, independent of 
the relative output from the project of which they are in charge. 
Constancy of u and u* over time follows from the fact that ω is constant and that W0 is 
given.  Equal effort levels across countries follow by combing ku = ωW0 and ku* = (1−ω)W0 
with the expression on the right hand-side of the first equality in (7).  In turn, this yields the 
result that the investor allocates equal amounts to the two projects. 
The demand function on the right hand-side of the first equality in (7) warrants a 
comment.  The first term here represents demand arising from potentially higher return on one 
of the projects.  Relative to a standard CAPM (e.g. Adler and Dumas, 1983), this demand is 
adjusted by a factor (r + 2R)/r.  The first term is 0 under full information because the optimal 
contract ensures equal effort levels across countries.  The second term on the right hand-side 
of the first equality in (7) is the portfolio share that minimizes the variance of time 1 wealth.  
This is always equal to ½ in our case, because the instantaneous standard deviation σ is equal 
for the two projects.  To sum up, with full information the investor chooses an allocation 
minimizing his wealth variance because the optimal contracts ensure equal expected returns 
for the two projects. 
 
3.  Moral Hazard in the Foreign Project 
 
We now turn to the case where the investor cannot observe the actions of the foreign 
manager.  Then, the investor faces an additional constraint in his problem: 
 ( ){ }
*
1* * * 21
2 0
arg max exp ( )t
u
u E r S k u dt ∈ − − − ∫ . 
This is the familiar incentive compatibility constraint, that is, the foreign manager chooses the 
u* that is in his best interest.  We follow Schättler and Sung (1993), and use the so-called first-
order approach to solve the investor’s problem.  In this approach, the incentive compatibility 
constraint in the principal’s problem is relaxed to the first-order necessary condition for 
optimality in the agent’s problem. 
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We also make the simplifying assumption that the optimal salary of the foreign 
manager is contingent on his own output only.  By introducing this assumption some 
generality is lost, but the model’s tractability and its illustrative ability are preserved.4  
Given these assumptions, the problem of the foreign manager is 
 ( ){ }* 1* * 212 0max exp ( )tu E r S k u dt − − − ∫ , 
subject to 
 * * *0 0(1 ) 't t tdX u W dt W d= − ω + Σw B , 
where w*’ = [0 (1−ω)].  Schättler and Sung (1993) show that the solution to this problem 
implies the optimal sharing rule to be of the following form (using our notation): 
 [ ]1 1 1 2* * 2 * 1 * * 1 * *1 12 20 0 0 0( ) (1 ) ' (1 ) ' 't t t tS U k u dt k u d r ku dt− −= + + − ω + − ω∫ ∫ ∫Σ ΣΣw B w w . (8) 
The first two terms in (8) provides the foreign manager with his certainty equivalent plus the 
compensation for the cost he actually incurs.  The next term is the compensation error, arising 
because the investor’s compensation is based on realized outcome rather than the manager’s 
actual effort.  Finally, to compensate the foreign manager for the risk he carries, a risk 
premium is paid, given by the last term in (8).5 
The investor’s relaxed problem can then be written as 
 ( ){ }[ ]
*
*
1
, , ,
max exp
u u S
E R W S S
ω
− − − − ,   
subject to (1), (3) and (8).  The solution to this problem is summarized in the second result. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose that the foreign manager’s effort level cannot be observed and that his 
salary depends on his own output only.  The salary of the foreign manager is linear in his own 
output and is given by 
 
*
* * *
1
0(1 )
kuS X
W
= κ +
− ω
, (9) 
where κ* ≡ U0 − ku* − ½ku*2 + ½rk2σ2u*2 is a constant.  The salary of the domestic manager 
depends on combined output: 
 
*
*
1 1
0
1
(1 )
R R kuS X X
r R r R W
 
= κ + + − + + − ω  , (10) 
                                                          
4 Actually, the model is solvable if S* is made a function of W1 in this section also, but the central asset demand 
equation turns out to be a polynomial of degree 4, giving very little economic insight. 
5 See Holmström and Milgrom (1987) or Schättler and Sung (1993) for further discussion of the optimal sharing 
rule under asymmetric information. 
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where κ ≡ (r + R)-1[ln(λr/R) − RW0 + ½rku2 − Rκ*] is another constant.  The optimal effort 
level for both the domestic and the foreign manager is constant over time and given by 
 0u Wk
ω
=  (11) 
  
2 2
*
0 02 2 2 2
(1 )
( 2 ) ( 2 )
r R rR rRu W W
k kr R r rR r R r rR
− ω + + σ ω σ ρ
= +
+ + + σ + + + σ
, (12) 
respectively.  Finally, the investor allocates a fraction 
 
* *
2
00
1
2 22 (1 )
u u r R ku
r WW R
− +
ω = − +
σ − ρ  (13) 
of initial wealth to the domestic project. 
  
The proof is in the appendix. 
From equation (9), we notice that the investor’s share of foreign final output depends 
on the choices of u* and ω, while with full information, it is determined solely by the 
parameters r and R.  For a given portfolio allocation, equation (12) implies that the effort level 
is lower than in the first-best situation (confer equation (6)).  Finally, for given effort levels, 
the asset demand function (13) differs from the first-best by the second term on the right 
hand-side, which is the foreign manager’s marginal cost of effort (divided by 2W0).  The 
higher is the marginal cost, the more resources are allocated to the foreign project (given u 
and u*), because a high marginal cost discourages effort, but the investor can counteract this 
by investing more resources in the foreign project, as can be seen from (12). 
Equations (11)-(13) can solely be expressed in terms of the parameters of the model, 
R, r, k, σ, and ρ, and these solutions will be presented below.  However, some interesting 
implications are apparent already at this stage. 
Suppose for instance that, as under full information, the parameters imply that the 
investor chooses the same allocation as under full information, ω = ½.  If so, equations (11) 
and (12) imply 
 
2*
2 2 2
(1 ) 1
2
r R rRu
u r R rR r
+ + + ρ σ
= <
+ + σ + σ
. 
With full diversification, the foreign manager puts in a lower effort than his domestic 
counterpart.  As a second example, suppose that the parameters are such that the domestic and 
the foreign manager make the same effort.  With u = u*, equations (11) and (13) imply that 
 10 
ω = 1/3.  Hence, to generate the same effort level from the two managers, the investor has to 
invest twice as much in the foreign project as in the domestic one.6 
These examples illustrate that the investor can increase expected output by investing 
more in the domestic project than in the foreign one.  More formally; from (11) we find that 
∂u/∂ω = W0/k, while |∂u*/∂ω| < W0/k from (12).  Hence, by reallocating resources from the 
foreign to the domestic project, the effort made by the domestic manager increases more than 
the corresponding decrease in the foreign manager’s effort.  This clearly contributes to a 
home-bias under asymmetric information.  However, the investor does not care about final 
output only, but also about how much of it he has to pay the managers according to the 
optimal contracts.  Now, since these contracts are influenced by the allocation of resources, 
we must take this into account when the optimal allocation policy is derived. 
Solving equations (11)-(13) for u, u*, and ω, we obtain 
 ( )[ ]1 2 2 2 0( ) ( ) ( )(1 (1 ))u kN r R rR r R k W−= + + σ + − σ − ρ  (14) 
 ( )[ ]* 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )u kN r R kR rR r R k kR W−= + − σ − ρ + σ + − − ρ − σ − ρ  (15) 
 ( )[ ]1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )(1 (1 ))kN r R rR r R k−ω = + + σ + − σ − ρ , (16) 
where 
 
( )[ ]2 2 2 23 12 2
2 3 2 2 2
(4 ) (3 ) (1 ) 2 2 (1 )
2( ) (1 ).
N rR r R k kR kr
r R r kR
= σ − ρ + − ρ − − ρ − σ − ρ − ρ − σ − ρ
+ + + σ − σ − ρ
 
The third result follows immediately. 
 
Proposition 3: If r3σ2 − kR2σ2(1−ρ) < rRσ2[kRσ2(1−ρ2) − r(2−ρ) − R(1−ρ)], the allocation 
under asymmetric information is tilted towards the domestic project relative to the first-best 
allocation. 
 
Proof: Follows immediately by imposing ω > ½ in (16) and simplifying. 
 
Interestingly, this result implies that we cannot rule out a “foreign-bias” where ω > ½.  But in 
general, the condition in proposition 3 is too complex to give any general statements on when 
a home-bias is most likely to occur in the model.  The reason for this ambiguity is that, as 
                                                          
6 There are two exceptions to these statements.  If either σ or r approaches 0, the foreign effort level u* will 
approach its first-best, see equation (12).  In these cases we would have u = u* and ω = ½ even with asymmetric 
information.  See also the numerical examples presented in the next section. 
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opposed to a standard portfolio selection model, the optimal allocation decision is the result of 
interactions with the optimal actions of the managers and the optimal compensation schemes.  
To get a hinge on these interactions and what conditions are most likely to create a home-bias, 
we next provide some numerical simulations. 
 
4.  Numerical Examples 
 
4.1 A Baseline Example 
The intuition in the following numerical illustrations is somewhat simplified by 
considering the case where the return shocks to the projects are uncorrelated, ρ = 0.  Notice in 
particular that from (12), the optimal sharing rules under asymmetric information can be 
expressed as 
 *1 1S AX BX= κ + + , (17) 
 * * *1S CX= κ + . (18) 
where A ≡ R/(r+R), B ≡ rRσ2/[r+R+(r2+2rR)σ2], and C ≡ (r+R+rRσ2)/[r+R+(r2 + 2rR)σ2] are 
all constants.  Hence, a fraction 1 − A = r/(r+R) of domestic final output and a fraction 1 − B 
− C = r2σ2/[r+R+(r2+2rR)σ2] of foreign final output are retained by the investor. 
Let us think of the [0,1] time interval as one year.  Then, σ gives the annual standard 
deviation of returns of the two projects. σ = 0.25 is used as the baseline value.  To obtain 
sensible annual expected returns, we furthermore set k = 5. In principal-agent problems, the 
agents are commonly assumed to be more risk-averse than the principal.  In this baseline 
experiment, we stick to this assumption, using r = 4 and R = 2 for the coefficients of absolute 
risk-aversion.  Finally, we assume a zero certainty equivalent (U0 = 0) on behalf of the 
managers and that the investor enters the year with wealth W0 = 1. 
By proposition 1, the first-best situation in the baseline experiment is characterized by 
u = u* = 0.1, and ω = 0.5.  Both managers receive R/(r+2R) = 25% of final total output 
plus/minus the constant amount K = lnλ/8 − 0.15.  The investor thus keeps half of the final 
output from the projects in addition to the constant amount 2K = 0.30 − lnλ/4.  In turn, this 
implies the investor’s expected net terminal wealth to be E[W1 − S − S*] = 1.33 − lnλ/4, with a 
standard deviation of SD[W1 − S − S*] = 0.118. 
When the foreign manager’s effort level is unobservable, equations (14)-(18) can be 
used to characterize the solution.  Table 1 reports the results. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the baseline example under asymmetric information 
u u* ω κ κ∗ A B C E[W1−S−S*] SD[W1−S−S*] 
0.111 0.071 0.557 lnλ/6−0.08 -0.35 1/3 0.066 0.801 0.92−lnλ/6 0.094 
Note: Calculations are based on the parameter values: r = 4, R = 2, k = 5, σ = 0.25, ρ = 0. 
 
The foreign manager’s second-best effort level implies that the expected return in his project 
drops to 7.1%.  Together with an increase in expected return from the domestic project to 
11.1%, this creates a home-bias. The domestic manager’s effort level is higher than in the 
first-best situation, even though the investor can observe his actions.  This is due to the fact 
that the marginal productivity of invested resources in the domestic project, which is linear in 
the amount invested, is higher than in the first-best and thus, the marginal cost of effort should 
be higher, implying increased effort. 
The foreign manager’s salary is S* = −0.35 + 0.801X1* while the compensation to the 
domestic manager is S = lnλ/6 − 0.08 + 1/3X1 + 0.066X1*.  Thus, the investor acquires only 
12.3 % of the output from the foreign project, while he retains 2/3 of domestic output.  In 
addition, the investor pays a constant amount κ + κ* = lnλ/6 – 0.49 to the managers.  (Notice 
that the constant amount may very well be negative.  That is, the managers may pay the 
investor to get a share of the final output).  Compared to the first-best situation, the standard 
deviation of expected net terminal wealth falls, which contributes to explain why the investor 
diversifies less than with full information: Optimal contracts contribute to lower wealth 
variance, and his need for diversifying the asset portfolio is thus smaller. 
 
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this baseline experiment, asymmetric information across countries generates a small 
home-bias in portfolio allocation.  How sensitive is this result to our parameter assumptions?  
In this subsection, we try to answer this question by performing some simple sensitivity 
analyses. 
We start by considering changes in the underlying uncertainty of the projects, σ.  If the 
effort levels were given, equation (13) shows that an increase in σ would mitigate the 
importance of the expected difference in return for the portfolio allocation decision.  
However, in our model, the expected difference in return itself is affected by a shift in σ.  
Moreover, the optimal salary contracts will also be affected, giving further bearings on the 
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asset allocation decision.  Table 2 reports the characteristics of the asymmetric information 
solution for different values of σ. 
 
Table 2: Sensitivity of the asymmetric information solution for changes in σ. 
σ u u* ω κ κ∗ A B C E[W1−S−S*] SD[W1−S−S*] 
→0 0.1 0.1 0.5 lnλ/6−0.03 −0.53 1/3 0 1 0.92−lnλ/6 0 
0.1 0.101 0.095 0.507 lnλ/6−0.04 −0.49 1/3 0.01 0.96 0.92−lnλ/6 0.034 
0.25 0.111 0.071 0.557 lnλ/6−0.08 −0.35 1/3 0.07 0.80 0.92−lnλ/6 0.094 
0.35 0.143 0.040 0.716 lnλ/6−0.12 −0.19 1/3 0.10 0.70 0.91−lnλ/6 0.168 
Note: Other parameters than σ have the same values as in table 1. 
 
As intuition suggests, the solutions for u, u* and ω approach first-best as σ goes to 0.  
For large values of σ, the expected difference in return, u − u*, is indeed substantial, thereby 
leading to a significant home-bias.  Notice also that the investor’s fraction of foreign output (1 
− B − C) increases with σ, while the constant amount he receives from the foreign manager, 
κ*, decreases. Together with less diversification and the increase in σ itself, this contributes to 
increase the standard deviation of net terminal wealth. 
 
Table 3: Sensitivity of the asymmetric information solution for changes in r. 
r u u* ω κ κ∗ A B C E[W1−S−S*] SD[W1−S−S*] 
0.01 0.1 0.1 0.5 lnλ/2.01−3.1 −0.53 ≈1 ≈0 ≈1 3.5−lnλ/2.01 ≈0 
0.5 0.105 0.092 0.525 lnλ/2.5−0.97 −0.48 0.8 0.03 0.97 1.57−lnλ/2.5 0.026 
1 0.108 0.087 0.541 lnλ/3−0.59 −0.45 2/3 0.03 0.95 1.27−lnλ/3 0.045 
4 0.111 0.071 0.557 lnλ/6−0.08 −0.35 1/3 0.07 0.80 0.92−lnλ/6 0.094 
6 0.108 0.068 0.541 lnλ/8−0.07 −0.33 1/4 0.06 0.74 0.95−lnλ/8 0.104 
10 0.097 0.066 0.484 lnλ/12−0.04 −0.31 1/6 0.06 0.64 0.96−lnλ/12 0.108 
Note: Other parameters than r have the same values as in table 1. 
 
Table 3 reports on the solution with asymmetric information for different values of the 
managers’ risk-aversion, r.  In the same manner as in table 2, a small r gives solutions for u, 
u* and ω close to the first-best.  Moreover, the optimal contracts are such that managers carry 
the entire output risk, giving a certain terminal net wealth to the investor.  For moderate 
values of r, the investor chooses to allocate more to his domestic project.  This effect is 
reversed for larger values of r, and from table 3, it appears that r = 10 implies foreign bias in 
portfolio allocation.  One of the mechanisms behind this is apparent from table 3.  The 
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fraction of foreign output the domestic manager obtains, increases with r for low values of 
this parameter.  As r increases, this fraction starts falling, however, making the foreign project 
more attractive for the investor.  The standard deviation of the investor’s net terminal wealth 
increases with r, as he must accept a larger part of the output-risk, the more risk-averse are the 
managers. 
Table 4 reports the solution of the model for different values of R. The foreign 
manager’s optimal effort level decreases with R as does the fraction of foreign output retained 
by the investor (1 − B − C).  Both effects make the foreign project less attractive.  Thus, even 
though increasing risk-aversion should strengthen the case for diversification, the portfolio 
allocation implies a considerable home-bias for large values of R.  We also notice that despite 
less diversification, the standard deviation of the net terminal wealth decreases with R,  since 
the optimal contracts imply that the managers take more and the investor less output-risk, the 
higher is the investor’s risk-aversion. 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity of the asymmetric information solution for changes in R. 
R U u* ω κ κ∗ A B C E[W1−S−S*] SD[W1−S−S*] 
0.01 0.089 0.088 0.445 lnλ/4.01+1.5 −0.44 ≈0 ≈0 0.79 −0.47−lnλ/4 0.115 
0.5 0.095 0.085 0.474 lnλ/4.5+0.42 −0.42 1/9 0.02 0.80 0.56−lnλ/4.5 0.108 
1 0.101 0.080 0.503 lnλ/5+0.18 −0.40 0.2 0.04 0.81 0.75−lnλ/5 0.102 
2 0.111 0.071 0.557 lnλ/6−0.08 −0.35 1/3 0.06 0.81 0.91−lnλ/6 0.094 
10 0.172 0.023 0.862 lnλ/14−0.68 −0.11 0.71 0.12 0.83 1.09−lnλ/14 0.062 
Note: Other parameters than R have the same values as in table 1. 
 
5.  Discussion and Concluding Comments 
 
We have studied the allocation decision of an investor with a foreign and a domestic 
project.  If he can observe the actions of the manager in charge of the domestic project, but 
not those of the foreign manager, his allocation will be tilted relative to the full information 
situation.  In the model, the investor’s allocation decision affects the managers’ effort levels, 
and the form of the contracts.  These effects are generally different under asymmetric 
information as compared to the first-best situation, and generally imply that the investor 
achieves a better risk-return characteristic of his net terminal wealth with an allocation 
different from full diversification. 
Four different effects determines the desirability of a given allocation decision: 
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1. The effect on expected final output.  This effect is due to the impact the allocation 
decision has on optimal effort levels from the two managers. 
2. The effect on the standard deviation of final output.  This is a direct effect of the portfolio 
allocation decision. 
3. The effect on the fraction of final output retained by the investor.  This is due both to the 
portfolio decision itself and to the indirect effect on the effort level of the foreign 
manager (see equation (9)). 
4. The effect on the constant amounts that the investor receives from/pays to the managers.  
This effect is due to induced changes in optimal effort levels. 
 
Under full information, effect 3 is irrelevant since the fraction of final output that investor 
retains is determined solely by the parameters r and R.  Moreover, effects 1 and 4 are zero 
because du*/du = -1 with full information (see equation (6)).  That is, a certain reallocation of 
the portfolio from, e.g., the foreign to the domestic project decreases the optimal effort level 
of the foreign manager by exactly the same amount as the increase in the domestic manager’s 
effort level.  Then, expected final output will be independent of portfolio allocation, as will be 
the total constant amount that the investor pays/receives.  This leaves only effect 2 as the 
relevant under full information.  The standard deviation of final output is minimized by full 
diversification, which the investor accordingly chooses. 
 The story is a different one under asymmetric information, when all effects above 
come into play.  Investing solely in the domestic project maximizes expected final output 
(effect 1).  This can be seen from equations (11) and (12) which imply that du*/du < -1.  I.e., 
when the investor increases investment in the domestic project, the higher expected return 
from the domestic project more than outweighs the corresponding fall in expected returns 
from the foreign project.  Effect 1 thus pull in the direction of a home-bias under asymmetric 
information.  Effect 2 counteracts this, but can not offset it.  The effect on the fraction of 
foreign output that is retained by the investor is ambiguously affected by the allocation 
decision, as is the effect on the total constant amount received/paid by the investor.  Hence 
effects 3 and 4 may or may not counteract the home-bias induced by effect 1.  In certain 
cases, the combined effect may be such that the investor tilts his portfolio towards the foreign 
project. 
 Although there is a theoretical possibility that asymmetric information may imply 
‘foreign-bias’ in the model, the numerical illustrations presented in section 4 generate a home-
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bias more often than the opposite.  However, the home-bias is often small in magnitude, 
leading us to conclude that the information structure investigated in this model is unlikely to 
explain the bias towards domestic markets observed in the data. 
This model is, in effect, a static portfolio allocation model where the investor can 
influence the expected returns from the assets through his allocation decisions.  It would be 
interesting to explore whether our result of an ambiguous effect from introducing asymmetric 
information was to survive a more general setup.  A first extension would be to allow for 
continuous reallocation on behalf of the investor.  What would then be the effect on the 
optimal allocation decisions under asymmetric information?  A second, and perhaps more 
interesting, extension is to consider a situation with one investor in each country owning a 
(divisible) domestic project.  With imperfectly correlated shocks, what would be the resulting 
equilibrium prices and allocation when the investors meet to trade, given that they know less 
about the actions of foreign managers?  What about managerial compensation and expected 
output compared to a situation where the domestic project has a domestic owner only? These 
and other questions are left open to future research. 
 
Appendix 
 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 
We start by deriving the optimal sharing rules in terms of the optimal controls u and 
u*, following Müller (1998).  Define net compensation to the domestic and foreign manager as 
1 21
2 0 t
y S k u dt= − ∫  and 1* * * 212 0 ( )ty S k u dt= − ∫ , respectively.  Then, integrating (1) and 
inserting the result in (2) imply that the investor’s problem can be expressed as 
 [ ]* *
*
0 0 1 0
1 2 * 21 1, , , ,
2 20 00
' ( )
max exp
(1 ) ( )u u y y t t t
W W y y
E R
W u ku W k u dtω
+ − − −        − −  + ω − + − ω −       ∫
Σw B B
, 
subject to (3) and (4).  Pointwise maximization with respect to y and y* gives the first-order 
conditions 
 
( )
( )
1 2 * 2 *1
21 0 0
* 1* 2 * 21
21 0 0
1 ln ( )
1 ln ( ) ,
t t
t t
r R Ry W W k u u dt y
r R R r R r R
r R Ry W W k u u dt y
r R R r R r R
λ   
= + − − + −   + + + 
λ   
= + − − + −   + + + 
∫
∫
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where λ and λ*  are the Lagrange-multipliers associated with (3) and (4), respectively.  
Solving these two equations for y and y* and using (3) and (4) to demonstrate that λ = λ*, we 
find that 
 ( ) [ ]( )1* 2 * 2121 0 01 ln ( )2 2 t tr Ry y W W k u u dtr R R r Rλ= = + − − ++ + ∫ . (A.1) 
The optimal sharing rules are 
1 21
2 0 t
S y k u dt= + ∫  and 1* * 212 0 ( )tS y k u dt= + ∫ , where y is given 
in (A.1). 
By substituting the optimal salary functions into (2), the investor’s problem can be 
simplified to 
 [ ]( ){ }* 1 2 * 2121 0, ,max exp ( )t tu u E a W b k u u dtω  − − − − + ∫  
subject to (1), where a ≡ rR/(r+2R) and b ≡ (r/2R)W0 − (r/2)ln(λr/R) are constants.  Let 
V(t,Wt) be the investor’s value function, giving the optimal remaining utility at time t.  By 
Lemma A1 in Sung (1995), the value function solving the above problem satisfies the 
following dynamic programming equation: 
 
[ ]
[ ]*
2
* 21
20 02
, , 2 * 21
2
(1 ) ' '
0 max
( ) ( , )
u u
t
V Vu u W WV W W
t ak u u V t W
ω
∂ ∂ ω + − ω +∂  ∂ ∂≡ +  ∂  + + 
ΣΣw w
, (A.2) 
with the terminal condition being V(t,Wt) = −exp[−a(W1 − b)].  From (A.2), the first-order 
conditions with respect to ut, ut*, and ω are 
 0
/
( , )
t
t
t
V Wu W
V t W a k
∂ ∂ ω
= −  (A.3) 
 * 0
(1 )/
( , )
t
t
t
V Wu W
V t W a k
− ω∂ ∂
= −  (A.4) 
 
*
2 2 2
0
/ 1
22 (1 ) /
u u V W
W V W
− ∂ ∂
ω = +
σ − ρ ∂ ∂ . (A.5) 
Next, we guess that the value function has the form 
 
( )
( )
*
0 0
2 2 *21
2 0
(1 ) (1 )
( , ) exp
' '
t
t
W t W u W u
V t W a
aW ku ku
+ − ω + − ω    
= − −  
+ − −    ΣΣw w
. (A.6) 
Using (A.6) in (A.3)-(A.5), we obtain equations (5)-(7).  Finally, substituting (A.6) into (A.2) 
confirms that (A.6) solves the investor’s dynamic problem. 
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A.2  Proof of Proposition 2 
We can proceed as under full information to find the optimal sharing rule between the 
investor and the domestic manager in terms of the optimal control u.  The first-order condition 
with respect to S for the investor’s relaxed problem is thus 
 ( ) ( ) 1* 2121 0 01 ln tr R rS W W S k u dtr R R r R r Rλ= + − − ++ + + ∫ . (A.7) 
Given the optimal sharing rules in (8) and (A.7), the investor’s (stochastic) net terminal 
wealth can be expressed as 
 
( ) [ ]
[ ]
1* 2 * 21
21 1 0 0 0
1 1 2* 1 * * 1 * *1
20 0
1 ln ( )
(1 ) ' (1 ) ' '
t t
t t t
r r RW S S W W V k u u dt
r R r R r
k u d rk u dt− −
λ
− − = − − − − ++ 

− − ω − − ω 
∫
∫ ∫Σ ΣΣw B w w
. 
It follows that the investor’s problem can be reduced to 
 
[ ]*
1 * 1 *
1 0
1 2, , 2 * 2 * 1 * *1 1
2 20
(1 ) '
max exp
( ) (1 ) ' '
t t
u u
t t t
W k u d
E
k u u r u dt
−
ω
−
     
− β − − ω   
− −α      
− + + − ω       
∫
∫
Σ
ΣΣ
w B
w w
, 
subject to (1), and where α ≡ rR/(r+R) and β ≡ (1/r)ln(λr/R) − (R/r)W0 + U0 are constants. 
The dynamic programming equation becomes 
 
( )[ ]
( )
*
* * 1 *
0 0
2
21
2 02, ,
22 *2 * 1 * *1
2
(1 ) (1 ) ' '
0 max ' '
( , ) ( ) (1 ) ' '
u u
t
V W u u ku W
W
V V W
t W
kV t W u u r u
−
ω
−
∂ ω + − ω + α − ω ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≡ + + ∂ ∂   + α + + + α − ω   
ΣΣ
ΣΣ
ΣΣ
w w
w w
w w
 
with the terminal condition being V(t,Wt) = -exp[-α(W1 − β)].  Writing out the matrices, the 
dynamic programming equation can be rewritten in a somewhat simpler form: 
 
( )[ ]
( )
[ ]
*
* * 2
0
2
2 2 2
02, ,
2 *2 *2 21
2
(1 ) 1 (1
10 max 1 2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
2
( ) ( )
u u
V W u u ku
W
V V W
t W
V k u u r u
ω
∂ ω + − ω + α − ω − ρ σ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
≡ + + σ + ω − ρ − ω − ρ ∂ ∂ 
+ α + + + α σ   
i
. (A.8) 
The first-order conditions with respect to u, u*, and ω, respectively, read: 
 0
/
( )
tV Wu W
V k
−∂ ∂ ω
=
αi
 (A.9) 
 
2 2
*
0 2 2
(1 )/ 1
( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
V Wu W
V k kr r
− ω−∂ ∂ + ασ ω ασ ρ 
= + α + + α σ + + α σ i  (A.10) 
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*
*
2 2 2
0
/ 1
22 ( / ) (1 )
V W u u ku
W V W
∂ ∂ − ω = − α + ∂ ∂ σ − ρ  . (A.11) 
We use 
 
( )[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
* * 2
0
2 2 21
2 0
2 *2 *2 21
2
(1 ) 1 (1 )
( , ) exp (1 ) 1 2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
( )
t t
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k u u r u
ω + − ω + α − ω − ρ σ         
= − −α − β + − − α σ + ω − ρ − ω − ρ      
− + + + α σ     
 
as a trial solution for the value function.  Taking the appropriate derivatives and substituting 
into (A.9)-(A.11) gives (11)-(13).  Equations (9) and (10) are obtained by combining (11) and 
(12) with (8) and (A.7) respectively.  Substituting the trial solution into (A.8) confirms that it 
solves the dynamic programming equation. 
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